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Contractarianism as a Political Morality1 
Benjamin Sachs 
 
Contractarianism initially made its mark as a sort of philosophical analogue of what 
scientists call the theory of everything.  For Hobbes, the first well known 
contractarian, contractarianism was supposed to settle every important question in 
moral and political philosophy.  It provided a theory of how individuals should treat 
each other, of how extensive the state’s power over the individual should be and 
toward what end it should use that power, and of the individual’s duty to obey the 
state and his/her right to overthrow the government.  This kind of contractarianism 
was well suited to its historical context: 17th-century Europe.  In that time and place, 
everything seemed up for grabs.  The old feudal systems and the Catholic hegemony 
were collapsing and two diametric opposites—democracy and monarchical 
absolutism—were vying to become the next dominant political model.  Furthermore, 
revolutions were rampant and it seemed there was nothing to hold back humankind’s 
underlying propensity for settling differences through violence and brutality.  So there 
was a place for something of the form of contractarianism—some theory of 
everything to explain how peace and order could be achieved in the face of 
disagreement and clashes of interests. 
 But then contractarianism fell out of favor, and it’s not hard to see why.  
Eventually, compelling non-contractarian answers to theretofore-open questions 
became established both de facto and de jure, thus robbing contractarianism of its 
motivation.  The spread of ideas of human rights and the moral equality of persons 
had much to do with this, as did the movement in philosophy toward the idea that a 
                                                          
1 I would like to thank the audience at the meeting of the Aristotelian Society at which I presented a 
previous draft of this paper, as well as Lisa Jones, Sarah Broadie, and especially Theron Pummer for 
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moral theory could be built on purely rationalistic grounds, combined with the 
suspicion that contractarianism is necessarily quite speculative. 
 Contractarianism, in the form of a theory of justice, was revived by Rawls.  
But even this more modest aim for contractarianism has been called into question, 
most notably by G.A. Cohen, who contends that we have other tools at our disposal, 
aside from contractarianism, for identifying the true conception of justice. 
 Fortunately for those of us who are attracted to contractarianism but find the 
standard objections to it compelling, there is an often overlooked strand of 
contractarianism—one that has its roots in James Buchanan2 and, I would argue, 
Kant3--that isn’t vulnerable to the standard objections: contractarianism as a political 
morality.  (A political morality is basically a morality constraining the state, though I 
will make that definition more precise in §5.) My goal here is to clear the space for 
contractarianism so understood by showing how it avoids the standard objections and 
provides answers to questions that cannot obviously be answered better some other 
way. 
 I arrive at this answer by beginning with contractarianism as a theory of 
everything and paring away the unappealing layers of contractarianism so understood.  
I begin, in §1, by describing what contractarianism is. Then, in §2, I dispense with 
contractarianism as a theory of legitimacy—a theory of the individual’s obligation to 
obey the state.  In §3, I discard contractarianism as a theory of interpersonal morality.  
Next, in §4, I concede Cohen’s point that contractarianism is not plausible as a theory 
of justice.  §5 is the heart of the essay; there I identify what philosophical questions in 
the general area of moral/political theory remain, having removed so much from 
                                                          
2 Specifically, Buchanan 1975.  
3 Specfically, the Kant of On the Common Saying: That may be Correct in Theory, but it is of No Use 
in Practice (in Kant 1996: 273-310).  This interpretation of Kant is shared by Michael Lessnoff (1986: 
91) and, I think, by Gerald Gaus (2012: 111-13)  
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contractarianism’s purview, and I sketch how contractarianism would go about 
addressing them.  Finally, in §6-9, I respond to four natural objections to 
contractarianism as a political morality. 
 
1. Characterizing Contractarianism 
 
Contractarianism, as I understand it, begins with a state of nature thought experiment.  
The state of nature is a situation in which there are no generally effective checks on 
individual behavior.  This may be because there is no widespread recognition of 
moral constraints, or rather simply because however much individuals might agree on 
what the moral constraints are they nevertheless cannot rely on each other to obey 
those constraints and agree about which actions constitute violations.  
 The second essential element of contractarianism is, of course, contracting.  
The idea is that rational individuals would perceive the state of nature as a non-ideal 
circumstance and therefore attempt to avoid it, and would do so by contracting with 
each other to create some publicly recognized authority.  This authority could take the 
form of a list of rules, a sovereign ruler with unlimited discretion and a monopoly on 
coercive force, or anything in between. 
 I’m interested in what moral/political question is supposed to be settled by this 
contracting, according to contractarianism understood the way I’ve described it.  My 
contention is that there is a set of important moral questions that needs to be 
answered—a set I call ‘political morality’—and that contractarianism escapes its 
standard shortcomings when construed as answering only them. 
 
2. Legitimacy 
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We begin, however, by examining the idea—which comes to us from Hobbes and 
Locke—that contractarianism can be used as a theory of legitimacy.  The question of 
the state’s legitimacy is often understood to be the question of the individual’s 
obligation to obey the state’s dictates (Kavka 1986: 22; Simmons 2001: 106), and the 
basic idea of contractarianism as a theory of legitimacy is that individuals are 
obligated to obey the state because through a contracting process that’s what they did 
agree to or would agree to.  But this is a seriously deficient theory of legitimacy no 
matter how it gets worked out.  The problems here are familiar and much discussed, 
so instead of trying to add anything new I will simply review what seem to me to be 
the key objections. 
 David Hume was perhaps the first to point out the most obvious problem, 
which is that most or perhaps all current states (Hume said all current states) were not 
founded through contracting, which is problematic because only actual contracting is 
morally transformative.4 Furthermore, even if current states were formed through 
contracting, that fact would seem to be irrelevant to the question of whether the 
current denizens of the state are obligated to obey its dictates, except in the rare case 
of a state whose current denizens are its founders. 
 Contractarianism has room for maneuver here if we are willing to be 
accommodating regarding what it takes for a theory to qualify as contractarian.  There 
may never have been any contracting in the sense of a group of individuals coming 
together and striking an agreement to form a state vested with a certain measure of 
authority over their behavior, but we may be able to at least understand individuals as 
consenting to the authority of the state.  Admittedly, such an action might not really 
                                                          
4 David Hume, ‘Of the Original Contract’ (in Locke, Hume and Rousseau 1947: 145-66).  Michael 
Lessnoff (1986: 87-90) emphasizes this problem as well. 
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qualify as contracting, since it isn’t reciprocal in the way that contracting is generally 
supposed to be.  But if we construe the underlying spirit of contractarianism-as-a-
theory-of-legitimacy as the idea that a state gains its legitimacy over the individual 
through an act of that individual’s will, then the consent theory would still qualify as 
contractarian. 
Nevertheless, problems persist, as Jean Hampton has nicely illustrated. There 
are four ways of understanding the connection between the individual agreeing to 
something and her having an obligation to obey the state, but there is trouble no 
matter which understanding the contractarian plumps for (Hampton 1986: 266-68).  
The first theory is simple: We are obligated to obey the state because our predecessors 
consented to the authority of the state.  This theory, however, succumbs to Hume’s 
objection; no such thing every happened and if it did it would nevertheless be morally 
irrelevant today.  The second theory proposes that currently living individuals actually 
consent to be subject to their state’s authority; its problem of course is that this is 
simply not true, as most people have never been invited to register their consent or 
dissent.  The third theory is that currently living individuals provide tacit consent, 
through their actions, to the state’s authority, while the fourth theory is that currently 
living individuals would, hypothetically, consent if they were invited to do so.  But 
both of these theories confront the same problem: tacit and hypothetical consent don’t 
seem to have any moral force.  It seems plausible to suppose that we are bound to do 
what we have actually agreed to, but the moral considerations underlying this thought 
lend no support at all to the idea that we are bound to do what we would agree to do  
(Dworkin 1989; Williams 2007: 479) or what our actions suggest we are content with. 
 
3. Interpersonal Morality 
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Having dispensed with contractarianism as a theory of legitimacy, we now move on 
to consider contractarianism as an interpersonal morality, or what we would 
ordinarily simply call “morality”—i.e., the set of moral obligations and permissions 
that apply to moral agents as such in their dealings with other individuals.  This 
version of contractarianis is found in the works of 20th- and 21st-century theorists such 
as John Harsanyi (1980), David Gauthier (1986), Gerald Gaus (2011, 2013), Jan 
Narveson (2013), and Jeffrey Reiman (1990: Chs. 1-2). 
As to whether contractarianism is an adequate interpersonal morality, I’ve 
argued elsewhere, in detail, that it is not (Sachs unpublished a: Ch. 2).  The argument, 
briefly, runs as follows.  First, moral theories, in general, have an explanatory job to 
perform; specifically, they must not only identify which actions are wrong but also 
identify what it is about them that makes them wrong.  Second the contractarian 
explanatory story is substantially impersonal.  When an action is wrong, the 
explanation of this, according to contractarianism, is that it would be forbidden by the 
contract that would be agreed as an alternative to the state of nature.  This explanation 
is impersonal in that no particular individual, aside from the perpetrator, is mentioned 
in it.   
Now the key move: Note that the explanatory story that a theory tells 
determines what that theory says about wronging—where “wronging” is a kind of 
wrongdoing that has a direction in that it is something that one individual (the 
perpetrator) does to another (the victim) and that has further implications in terms of 
the appropriateness of resentment, apology and forgiveness.  Depending on what the 
explanation of a certain instance of wrongdoing is, we can determine whether that 
instance of wrongdoing is an instance of wronging. 
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The payoff of all this is that since the contractarian explanatory story for each 
instance of wrongdoing is impersonal, then according to contractarianism no 
wrongdoing counts as wronging, since wronging is a personal relation between a 
perpetrator and a victim.  Therefore, contractarianism is an inadequate theory of 
interpersonal morality, as some violations of interpersonal morality are indeed cases 
of wronging (rape, for instance). 
 One possible response is that contractarian explanations of wrongdoing do 
indeed mention individuals other than the perpetrator, namely all the parties to the 
contract.  But to say that a case of rape is an offense against everyone is just as 
counterintuitive as to saying that it’s an offense against no one.  
 Note, finally, that if we treat contractarianism only as a morality governing the 
state, which is what I later will suggest we should do, the impersonal nature of the 
explanatory story it tells is no longer a problem.  Suppose, for instance, that the state 
fails to dictate which side of the road its denizens should drive on, and that this leads 
to many fatal car accidents.  I assume we all accept that this constitutes wrongdoing 
on the state’s part.  Contractarianism as a political morality will say that this 
constitutes wrongdoing on account of its constituting a failure on the part of state to 
do what the contract demands that it do (solve life-threatening coordination problems, 
perhaps).  This wrongdoing is a wrong to all parties to the contract equally, if anyone.  
I see nothing unreasonable about such an implication. 
  
4. Justice 
 
In this section I investigate the idea that contractarianism should be understood the 
way Rawls (1999) understood it, namely as a theory of the state’s obligations of 
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justice—or, to put it more succinctly, as a fundamental theory of justice.  The basic 
idea is that the content of the contract settles what justice fundamentally requires the 
state to do.  So if the contract secures freedom of expression for everyone, then the 
state has a fundamental obligation of justice to allow individuals to express 
themselves. 
G.A. Cohen (2008: Chs. 6-7) rejects this use of contractarianism.  His 
argument is long and complex and unfortunately I can do no more than summarize it 
here.  Briefly, it runs as follows: First, ultimate normative principles—principles 
regarding what an agent ought to do—are fact-insensitive.  In other words the 
fundamental truths about what individuals ought to do are not sensitive to what the 
non-normative facts are.  Second, the principles that emerge from the contractarian 
thought experiment are fact-sensitive, because the contractors are stipulated to be in 
possession of knowledge of the facts and their knowledge of those facts influences 
their thinking regarding which principles to advocate.  Cohen takes Rawls as his 
target here, noting that Rawls allows his contractors to have knowledge of basic 
sociological and psychological facts as well as knowledge that the circumstances of 
justice obtain.  But, as Cohen (2008: 294) notes, the claim applies to contractarianism 
per se.5 This is the case because a universal feature of contractarianism is that it 
imagines the contractors as being given the task of agreeing principles to regulate 
some domain of affairs, and we cannot sensibly imagine the contractors having 
preferences on how some domain of affairs should be regulated if they know nothing 
about how the domain works.  From these two premises we may conclude that 
contractarianism does not yield fundamental principles. 
                                                          
5 Actually, Cohen aims his critique at all constructivists, where ‘constructivism’ is the view that “a 
principle gains its normative credentials through the being the product of a sound selection procedure” 
(2008: 274).  Contractarianism is, as Cohen notes, a version of constructivism. 
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Third, justice is just one normative domain among many.  Fourth, the 
principles that emerge from the contractarian though experiment will inevitably be 
sensitive to the entire range of normative considerations.  This, again, is due to the 
practical nature of the contracting situation.6 The contractors are given the task of 
drafting principles to regulate some domain of affairs, and it would run counter to 
sensible psychological assumptions to depict the contractors as caring only about 
justice and therefore designing principles that cater only to justice and to no other 
normative agenda.  From these two premises Cohen concludes that the principles 
inferable from the contractarian thought experiment are not principles of justice. 
Putting the conclusions of the foregoing two arguments together, Cohen 
arrives at his overall critique of contractarianism as a fundamental theory of justice: 
Contractarianism yields principles that are neither fundamental nor about justice. 
I believe that this argument is sound.7 Others deny this, of course, but I lack 
the space here to defend Cohen against objections.  Instead, I will simply assume that 
he’s right. 
 
5. Political Morality 
 
Suppose I were to suggest, in light of all this, that contractarianism be used only as a 
theory of the state’s all-things-considered moral obligations.  One would surely think 
I’d missed the point of Cohen’s critique.  Justice is an aspect of morality, and 
therefore if contractarianism cannot reveal the requirements of justice then ipso facto 
                                                          
6 On the practical nature of the contracting situation and why it is important to distinguish the practical 
question confronting the contractors from the theoretical question confronting you and I, see ibid., pp. 
276-7. 
7 Specifically, it’s a sound argument against Rawlsian contractarianism.  Some believe (rightly, I think) 
that there’s a valid way of understanding A Theory of Justice on which it’s not contractarian.  With 
regard to that interpretation of Rawls, Cohen’s objections are irrelevant. 
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it cannot reveal the requirements of morality all-things-considered.  We can be pretty 
much certain that this is precisely what Cohen would have said in response to such a 
proposal.  We know this because although Cohen never responded to that proposal, he 
does respond, in Rescuing Justice and Equality, to a similar proposal: to construe 
contractarianism as yielding the all-things-considered correct rules for regulating 
society.  And what he says against that proposal is that although the correctness of a 
rule of regulation is a function of many things, of which its adherence to justice is 
only one, such principles should serve justice “as much as principles in all due reason 
should and can” (1999: 305; see also p.284).  Therefore, we cannot know which rules 
of regulation are best if we don’t know what justice requires (1999: 266-67, 286).  
Consequently we make a mistake if we skip straight to the question of what the all-
things-considered correct rules of regulations are.  Similarly, Cohen would no doubt 
maintain that we make a mistake if we skip straight to the question of what morality 
requires of the state all-things-considered. 
 Note, however, that justice is an aspect of interpersonal morality, which is to 
say that individuals have obligations of justice to each other.  Given this, the 
contractarian can apparently construct an adequate rejoinder to Cohen’s objection by 
making three moves.  The first move is to adopt, in addition to contractarianism, some 
theory of interpersonal morality—specifically, one that concedes the existence of 
obligations of justice.  The second move is to assert that the state is bound by the 
requirements of interpersonal morality.  Neither of these first two moves is ad hoc.  If 
contractarianism is not itself the true interpersonal morality, as I argued in §3, then 
there is nothing stopping somebody who accepts contractarianism as a political 
morality from adopting some other theory of interpersonal morality.8 And it is quite 
                                                          
8 A contractarian might, for instance, emulate Kant, who endorsed contractarianism in political 
morality (I maintain) but also the categorical imperative in interpersonal morality.  Another 
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plausible to say that the state is bound by the requirements of interpersonal morality.9  
It makes sense as a matter of theory since the state is an agent, and the requirements 
of interpersonal morality are supposed to apply to agents as such.  (Or, if one is 
discomfited by the metaphysics of ascribing agency to an abstract entity, we can at 
least say that the state is an entity through which flesh-and-blood agents exercise their 
agency.10) And it has comforting implications for cases; it implies that, like flesh-and-
blood agents, the state ought not lie, kill, cheat or steal.11 
 Unfortunately, the first two moves, when combined, leave us with an apparent 
contradiction.  They imply that something other than contractarianism tells us what 
the state is morally obligated to do, and yet I proposed at the outset of this section 
contractarianism is best understood as telling us what the state is morally obligated to 
do.  However, the apparent contradiction can be resolved as long as we make the third 
move: maintaining that 1) something other than contractarianism, namely the correct 
theory of interpersonal morality, settles what the state is obligated-qua-agent to do, 
and 2) contractarianism settles what the state is obligated-qua-state to do.  Again, 
there is nothing arbitrary about this move.  It makes no less sense than saying that 
there are some obligations we humans have simply because we are agents while there 
                                                                                                                                                                      
contractarian who employed a non-contractarian interpersonal morality was Locke: he was a 
contractarian (though about legitimacy, not about political morality) and endorsed natural rights theory 
in interpersonal morality.  
9 It may seem odd to suggest that the state is constrained by interpersonal morality, given that (as is 
commonly thought) one of the state’s purposes is to resolve disputes about interpersonal morality.  But 
there’s no problem here.  I can allow that one role of the state is to resolve such disputes; what I cannot 
allow is that it resolves them by making it true that one party to the dispute is right and the others are 
wrong.  (The reason I cannot allow this is that it would be paradoxical to think of the state as being 
constrained by a system of norms the content of which it has control over.) 
10 Likewise, if one is discomfited by saying that a state can do wrong, then we can say instead that the 
state is an entity through which flesh-and-blood agents—in this case, judges, legislators, bureaucrats—
can do wrong. 
11 One might think that we have another route to the conclusion that the state ought not lie, kill, cheat 
or steal: namely, we can say that political morality prohibits the state to do these things.  However, 
while political morality can explain why the state has certain obligations to its own denizens, it cannot 
explain why the state has obligations to anyone else, as it surely does in the case of lying, killing, 
cheating and stealing. 
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are other obligations we have because of certain roles we occupy (parent, friend, 
teacher, e.g.). 
 I began this section with the idea that contractarianism tells us what the state 
ought to do all-things-considered.  We anticipated that Cohen would respond by 
objecting that we cannot know what the state ought to do all-things-considered until 
we first know what justice requires of the state, and of course contractarianism cannot 
tell us what justice requires of the state (as I admitted in §4).  I responded by 
suggesting that since the state is both an agent and a special kind of agent—a state—it 
is entirely plausible to think that it will take two moral theories to give us the full 
story as to what the state is obligated to do.  Obligations of justice are obligations of 
interpersonal morality and surely the state is constrained by interpersonal morality.  
But what obligations the state has because it is a state is a separate matter, and 
contractarianism could well be the right theory of those obligations even if it would 
be defective as a theory of justice. 
I can now state my thesis: Contractarianism is most plausible when it is 
construed as political twice over, in virtue of taking as its subject matter the state’s 
obligations and in virtue of taking as its subject matter obligations-qua-state.  So, 
contractarianism is most plausible as a theory of the state’s all-things-considered 
obligations-qua-state.  Or, as I prefer to say, it should be understood as a political 
morality. 
 
6. The Pluralism Objection 
 
One may believe that Cohen’s worry about contractarianism failing to distinguish 
justice from other normative considerations still applies given my suggested version 
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of contractarianism.  For even that version of contractarianism treats the content of 
political morality as being settled in one fell swoop by the state of nature thought 
experiment, while someone like Cohen might believe that political morality is a 
function of many values, each of which must be analyzed separately.  To understand 
whether this objection succeeds, I need to say more than I’ve yet said regarding the 
contractarian’s position on the grounds of political morality.  I do so in what follows. 
I’ve suggested that contractarians should construe political morality as role 
morality—specifically, the morality of being a state.  Obviously the role in question 
should be conceived of as socially constructed as opposed to natural.  Having said this 
much, the contractarian can go on to point out that traditionally we think of the role 
morality associated with any socially constructed role as being grounded in the 
purpose of the role, which in turn exists in virtue of intentional human action.  
Consider the attorney role.  Why is it a part of the role morality of an attorney to act 
in the best interests of her clients?  Because attorneys have the purpose of playing the 
role of advocate in our adversarial justice system, and they wouldn’t be good 
advocates if they didn’t act in the best interests of their clients.  And of course the 
adversarial justice system is an intentional human creation. 
So if political morality is indeed role morality, then in order to determine the 
contents of political morality we need to discern the purpose of the state, which in 
turn requires understanding what intentional human activity grounds its existence.  
This is exactly what a state of nature thought experiment is used, by the contractarian, 
to provide.12 The thought experiment is supposed to provide a rational reconstruction 
                                                          
12 The state of nature thought experiment is, of course, just that—a thought experiment.  One might 
wonder why, in that case, contractarianism as a political morality isn’t doomed, as I admitted 
contractarianism as a theory of legitimacy is by Hume’s observation that no such contracting every 
occurred.  The short answer, on which I intend to expand in a separate paper, is that while the moral 
force of contracting certainly depends on its being actual, its teleological force (it’s purpose-conferring 
aspect) doesn’t. 
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of the activity on the part of rational agents that leads to the existence of the state and 
gives it its purpose.13 
From all this the contractarian will conclude that an investigation of political 
morality has to start with a state of nature thought experiment.  But the contractarian 
need not go on to say either of the following two things: 1) That political morality 
does not contain distinct constituent parts—i.e. is not pluralistic; 2) that the state of 
nature thought experiment settles on its own the entire content of political morality. 
First, the contractarian can allow that political morality is pluralistic, even 
irreducibly pluralistic.  But the way the contractarian can allow for that is by telling a 
plausible state of nature story on which the contractors want the state they’re creating 
to accomplish an irreducible plurality of things.  So perhaps the contractors would be 
concerned that their well-being be augmented, and also concerned that their natural 
rights be protected, and perhaps neither concern would be reducible to the other.14  
Second, the contractarian can allow that her thought experiment does not settle 
in one fell swoop the entire contents of political morality.  This is true for at least two 
reasons.  First, the contractors might resolve that certain matters of political morality 
are to be settled by democratic procedures.  And second, the contract might contain 
certain concepts that are left somewhat vague, in which case it would be up to us, as 
interpreters of the contract, to reason out its implications. 
The takeaway from all this is that the state of nature thought experiment is, for 
the contractarian, the starting point of political morality.  For the contractarian, every 
                                                          
13 I dedicate a whole other essay to explaining how this works.  See Sachs unpublished b. 
14 The contractarian might even argue that the contactors would care to see justice secured.  It could be, 
in other words, that the contractors would want the state to take on the role of enforcing that part of 
interpersonal morality known as ‘justice’.  The state would then be obligated twice over to secure 
justice.  It would be obligated-qua-agent to do this, just as every other moral agent (we are assuming) is 
so obligated, and also obligated-qua-state to do the same thing.  (Even Cohen would have no objection 
to using the state of nature thought experiment to establish that the state is obligated-qua-state to secure 
justice.  What he objects to is using the state of nature thought experiment to establish the content of 
justice.) 
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truth of political morality is grounded somehow in an aspect of the thought 
experiment.  But this grounding may be only partial, and so the contractarian need not 
and should not say that her thought experiment settles the entirety of political 
morality. 
 
7. The Fact-Sensitivity Objection Revisited 
 
It may be argued that I’m still missing the point of Cohen’s fact-sensitivity critique, 
which is that all the foundational facts about what the state should do, including the 
foundational facts of political morality, are fact-insensitive, and therefore 
contractarianism can reveal none of them since its state of nature thought experiment 
is fact-sensitive.   
To evade this criticism, the contractarian should, I propose, make use of the 
idea advanced earlier of political morality as role morality.  What the contractarian 
should maintain, I suggest, is that contractarianism can reveal the principles that are 
foundational as far as political morality is concerned, while admitting that it cannot 
reveal any principles that are foundational strictly speaking. 
 For the sake of illustration, consider again the practice of law—our earlier 
example of an area of activity that contains roles and corresponding role moralities.  
Suppose someone were to propose that the principle requiring attorneys to act in the 
best interests of their clients is foundational within the role morality of practicing law.  
This is a reasonable proposal, as it’s not clear what normative principle for the 
attorney qua attorney could be more fundamental.  This is not to say, however, that 
the proposed principle is foundational strictly speaking.  Rather, it seems to draw 
support from the idea of the attorney as occupying a certain role within the justice 
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system, namely the role of advocate, plus the principle that individuals should do the 
things that it is their role to do.  Note that this latter principle is not a principle for the 
attorney qua attorney.  Rather, it is perfectly general principle that applies to every 
moral agent.  So the principle, ‘attorneys should act in the best interests of their 
clients’, is plausibly regarded as foundational within the role morality of the attorney 
but not foundational strictly speaking.  Furthermore, it is fact-sensitive.  It is based on 
the idea that the role of an attorney is to be an advocate, which itself is contingent on 
the various facts about human intentions and that make it the case that there is this 
institution known as the adversarial justice system and a role within that institution 
known as the attorney. 
 The key to seeing why and how a contractarian can make use of a strategy like 
this for evading Cohen’s criticism is remembering that contractarianism, as we are 
now understanding it, coexists alongside some (non-contractarian) theory of 
interpersonal morality.  So the contractarian can, and I propose should, say that the 
entire enterprise of political morality is an outgrowth of, and is ultimately grounded 
in, some principle of interpersonal morality.  This allows contractarianism to be 
foundational in the most robust sense that anyone could want from a political morality 
having acknowledged the distinction between the state’s obligations-qua-person and 
its obligations-qua-state.  It makes no sense to demand any kind of fundamentality 
from a political morality other than its containing the most fundamental truths 
regarding the state’s obligations-qua-state.15 
                                                          
15 In making this argument I hope to have shown how to avoid another of the classic objections to 
contractarianism, which is that it needs to presuppose at least one element of morality—the moral 
bindingness of contracts—in order to get off the ground, and therefore it presupposes the very thing it 
is supposed to ground (see, e.g., Levy (2009: 209-10)).  My point is that contractarianism can be quite 
useful even if it is not conceived of as a theory about what grounds morality, and therefore 
contractarians shouldn’t hesitate to take for granted a pre-existing moral framework in which 
contractarianism as a political morality can find its footing. 
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 Contractarianism can be foundational in this sense while being fact-sensitive.  
As I said earlier, my view is that a contractarian theory should begin with a state of 
nature thought experiment from which it is inferred that the state has such-and-such a 
purpose.  From such a claim, plus the interpersonal moral principle ‘agents should do 
what it is their role or purpose to do’ and the supplemental claim that the state is an 
agent, the contractarian can infer certain obligations incumbent upon the state qua 
state—that is, the contractarian can infer certain foundational principles of political 
morality.  And all of this will be fact-sensitive because it will be based on a claim 
about the role of the state, which will itself be supported by the state of nature thought 
experiment, which includes facts about what the state of nature and the contractors are 
like.   
 
8. A Political Morality Must do Double Duty as a Theory of Legitimacy 
 
The third objection takes the form of the following argument: A political morality 
tells us some of the facts about what the state is obligated to do, and presumably the 
state is permitted to do everything it is obligated to do.  Therefore, a political morality 
tells us, indirectly, something about what the state is permitted to do.  Furthermore, 
since (presumably) the people are obligated to allow the state to do anything that it is 
permitted to do, a political morality thereby tells us (indirectly, again) something 
about the people’s obligation to obey the state.  And this is the job of a theory of 
legitimacy, by my earlier definition of ‘legitimacy’.  So it seems a political morality 
must do double duty as at least a partial theory of legitimacy.  This argument is 
problematic for me, as I have been proposing that contractarianism is compelling as a 
political morality while insisting that it is not compelling as a theory of legitimacy. 
 18 
 One problem with this argument is its first inference.  I don’t accept that, in 
general, agents are permitted to do whatever they’re obligated to do.16 Suppose, 
however, that that inference is valid.  Still, I can construct an adequate defense of my 
position.  The most plausible reason why the first inference would be valid—that is, 
why it would be the case that role morality obligates the state to do only things that 
interpersonal morality permits the state to do—is that interpersonal morality 
constrains role morality: in other words, we cannot obligate an agent qua role-bearer 
to do anything that she is prohibited-qua-agent from doing.  If this principle held, then 
from the fact that a political morality obligates the state to φ we could infer that 
interpersonal morality permits the state to φ and therefore the correct theory of 
legitimacy requires the people to allow the state to φ.  But in this scenario the correct 
political morality, whatever it is, still wouldn’t ground any of the facts as to what the 
people are obligated to allow the state to do.17 And surely a theory doesn’t count as a 
theory of legitimacy if it doesn’t tell us how such facts are grounded.  So if the first 
inference is valid then contractarianism could nevertheless be the true political 
morality while being a false theory of legitimacy.  
 
9. This is a Pyrrhic Victory for Contractarianism 
 
The fourth objection is that the viability of the form of contractarianism I’m 
describing here would amount to no more than a Pyrrhic victory for contractarianism, 
                                                          
16 I have an argument for this; see Sachs (unpublished a: Ch. 3). 
    Moreover, if there are cases in which someone is obligated-but-not-permitted to do something, we 
would expect to find those cases wherever we find role moralities (which is of course what I’ve said 
contractarianism plausibly is—it’s the true role morality of the state).  This is because role moralities 
always exist against the backdrop of interpersonal morality, as I explained in §5, and the presence of 
two moralities creates the possibility of moral dilemmas.   
17 Essentially the reverse would be true, on a case-by-case basis: the fact that the people aren’t 
obligated to allow the state to φ would in some cases undermine what would otherwise be an obligation 
on the part of the state to φ. 
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since it has so many of the critical moral issues being settled by something other than 
the contractarian theory. 
 But what this objection describes as a weakness of my version of 
contractarianism I consider a virtue.  This goes back to what I said in the introduction 
about the historical development of contractarianism.  Contractarianism burst on to 
the philosophical scene at a moment when everything of moral importance seemed up 
for grabs.  But this is no longer the world in which we live.  Much has been settled, 
and the contractarian—and indeed any political theorist, for that matter—should be 
happy to take on board anything that has found a solid philosophical footing.  This is 
the major payoff of building a version of contractarianism that leaves room for 
interpersonal morality.  The contractarian can take on board the widely accepted 
moral-equality-of-persons thesis and use it to explain certain constraints on the 
contracting situation (e.g. that the contract must be unanimously agreed to).  
Similarly, the contractarian can make use of human rights theory and say that no 
matter what the outcome of the contracting situation, the state is morally prohibited 
from throwing people in prison on account of their political beliefs.  The contractarian 
can, in addition, simply bring on board an independently developed theory of 
legitimacy, such as the idea that the individual is obligated to obey the law just when, 
and because, it has come into force through a democratic process that meets certain 
requirements of representativeness, openness, etc. 
 Even granting all this, there are still plenty of questions to be answered 
regarding what the state morally ought to do.  Some of them, I contend, should be 
answered by the contractarian theory, though not all of them; there is still more 
whittling to be done before we find contractarianism’s subject matter.  For as I said in 
§6, presumably one outcome of the state of nature thought experiment would be a 
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decision in favor of democracy, and democracy of course means leaving some 
decisions in the hands of the people through their representatives.  In other words, 
believing in democracy means believing that many questions of the form, “What 
morally ought the state to do about X” have the following answer: “The will of the 
people morally ought to determine how the state acts with respect to X”. Thus we 
have found yet more moral questions about the state that are not to be answered 
(except indirectly) by the contractarian theory, even if contractarianism is correct. 
However, there are many questions about what the state morally ought to do 
that aren’t settled by interpersonal morality and that democrats themselves would 
concede are not to be settled by the will of the people—I have in mind, roughly, what 
are often called constitutional matters.  One of them is the matter of which questions 
are to be settled by the will of the people.  Should we plump for a separation of 
powers in which a constitution and a court with the power of judicial review limit the 
will of the people, exercised through the legislature?  This question has to be 
answered before the legislature itself is set up.  Another such question is how to 
structure the system of voting and districting.  
Another two examples: (1) many people believe it is the job of the state to 
fund the arts and scientific inquiry, and (2) many people believe that it is the job of 
the state to enforce interpersonal morality per se.  But, in each case, others disagree.  
This is not an issue to be resolved by appealing to the democratic will of the people, 
since what’s at issue is whether, and if so when, the state should ever refuse to engage 
in some activity that its people want it to engage in.  And despite the fact that the state 
is constrained by interpersonal morality, these questions cannot be settled by 
identifying the true interpersonal morality.  These disputes seem to be distinctly about 
the state, and as such it takes a political morality to answer them.  Contractarianism is 
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well suited to answer them, not just for the obvious reason that contractarianism is a 
political morality, but furthermore because contractarianism begins by asking what 
the role of the state is, which seems like an issue that it would be helpful to have a 
grip on if we’re to determine whether the state should be funding the arts and 
scientific inquiry and enforcing interpersonal morality.  Furthermore, these are very 
important issues—issues of life and death, in some cases. 
So even conceding all I have here, there is still plenty of importance for 
contractarianism to accomplish, even if not quite the most important things or the 
things on which contractarianism has historically been taken as providing guidance. 
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